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Bank dealers play a central role in securities and derivatives markets and
are active traders in their own right. Their trading risks and risk manage-
ment are important to the banks’ soundness and the functioning of securi-
ties and derivatives markets. In this paper, we use proprietary daily trading
revenues of six large bank dealers to study their market risks using a mar-
ket factor model approach. We estimate the bank dealers’ exposures to ex-
change rate, interest rate, equity, and credit market factors.
Traditionally, the safety and soundness of the banking system has been
the principal focus of interest in bank dealer risk. Important for this pur-
pose is the level of market risk taken by bank dealers and the level of com-
monality in their risk exposures. In recent literature, the focus has been
extended to the eﬀects of bank dealers’ and other trading institutions’ risk-
management policies on market stability. In using risk measures based on
market volatility, and in particular value at risk (VaR), it has been argued
that institutions’ demands for risky assets will move simultaneously, which
will lead to exaggerated price movements and market instability. When
market volatility is low, institutions will increase demands to hold risky
assets, putting upward pressure on prices and, when market volatility be-
comes high, institutions will attempt to reduce their positions in risky as-
sets, putting downward pressure on prices. This behavior is said to have
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ing the Russian ruble devaluation and debt moratorium and the near fail-
ure of Long-term Capital Management (LTCM).1
Despite the strong interest, there has been little study of bank dealer
risks and risk management, and there appears to be little formal evidence
on the size, variation, or commonality in dealer risks. In signiﬁcant mea-
sure, this owes to limited public information on dealer positions and in-
come, which limits the study of dealer risks and risk management. Indi-
vidual banks report on trading positions and revenues only quarterly, and
reporting is limited to securities and derivatives in broad market cate-
gories. While there is weekly reporting, it includes security positions and
transactions—but only limited information on derivatives, and data is re-
ported only for aggregated primary (bank and nonbank) dealers.2
Bank VaRs, which forecast the maximum loss on the trading portfolio
with a given conﬁdence, provide a direct measure of market risk. However,
VaRs do not reveal the dealers’ underlying market exposures or their size.
Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) also found the risk forecast performance of
the daily VaRs for the banks examined in this study to be weak. Further,
there was no common pattern in the correlation of VaRs across banks.
Here we apply a factor model to the daily trading revenues of six large
bank dealers to estimate their market risk exposures. Factor models have
long been used to study portfolio and ﬁrm market risks (e.g., Chen, Roll,
and Ross 1986, Flannery and James 1984). Closer to our objectives is 
their application to mutual fund and hedge fund returns to characterize 
the market risks in the funds’ portfolios (e.g., Sharpe 1992, Fung and Hsieh
1997).
With daily trading revenues, we can study the eﬀects of daily market
price moves on the banks’ trading portfolios. Also, the sample sizes are
large, about 1,200 daily observations per bank. However, the trading rev-
enue data is subject to signiﬁcant limitations as well. Risk exposures can be
inferred only through eﬀects on trading revenues. Trading revenues include
fee and spread income and net interest income, as well as market gains and
losses on positions. Further, while used by the banks internally and re-
quired for VaR model testing, the daily trading revenues lack the account-
ing scrutiny accorded to quarterly reports.
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1. For dynamic analyses of market eﬀects of a VaR constraint, see Basak and Shapiro
(2001), Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2002), Persaud (2000), and Morris and Shin (1999).
For diﬀerent analyses of the risk-taking incentives and portfolio choice eﬀects of a VaR con-
straint, see Basak and Shapiro (2001), Cuoco and Liu (2003), and Alexander and Baptista
(2004).
2. Jorion (2005) analyzes bank dealer trading risks and VaRs and implications for systemic
market risk using quarterly reported trading revenues and VaR-based market risk capital re-
quirements. Adrian and Fleming (2005) provide a description of data collected and reported
for primary securities dealers and present some evidence on dealer risk taking based on dealer
ﬁnancing data.In the standard factor model, factor coeﬃcients represent estimates of
ﬁxed portfolio exposures. For bank dealers, exposures are variable, as deal-
ers actively trade their positions and are not buy-and-hold investors. Thus,
the standard factor model approach may not apply here. This leads us to
ﬁrst consider a factor model framework and estimation issues when posi-
tions are variable. The framework is used in implementing two empirical
modeling approaches where trading positions are variable.
One approach is a random coeﬃcient model, where the factor coeﬃ-
cients represent randomly varying market factor exposures. Using the ran-
dom coeﬃcient framework of Hildreth and Houck (1968), the dealers’
mean exposures to diﬀerent market factors and the variances of exposures
are estimated. Estimates of average daily market risk exposures are small
relative to average trading revenues and cannot account for much of the
trading revenue variation. The signs of the exposures also diﬀer across the
banks, indicating heterogeneity in average exposures. A notable exception
is the interest rate factor, where all banks but one exhibit small net long ex-
posures to interest rate risk.
Even with small average exposures risk taking could still be large, since
dealers could vary positions between large long exposures and large short
exposures. Our estimates indicate signiﬁcant variation in market exposures
that include both long and short positions. Nonetheless, the ranges of po-
tential variation in trading revenues due to variation in market exposures
do not appear large relative to the total variation in trading revenues.
The random coeﬃcient model is based on highly simplifying assump-
tions about the variability in exposures. Especially important is the as-
sumption that exposures are independent of the market factors, which con-
ﬂicts with portfolio strategies that are related to market prices. This issue
has also been important in hedge fund studies, some of whom have tailored
the functional form of the factor model to certain types of portfolio strate-
gies. It is subsequently argued that specifying an appropriate functional
form requires a good deal of speciﬁcity on the portfolio strategy. However,
our information on bank dealer strategies is too sparse to formulate a spe-
ciﬁc portfolio strategy or unambiguously interpret results from alternative
functional forms that might be used.
A more limited approach to considering market price-dependent trad-
ing strategies is taken here. For each bank, a linear factor model with a 150-
day rolling sample is estimated. Using historical plots, the six banks’ roll-
ing regression factor coeﬃcients are compared to the respective factors’
contemporaneous 150-day rolling means. The latter will reﬂect periods 
of rising and declining market prices. Of interest is whether the rolling co-
eﬃcients move systematically with the factors. This would indicate that the
dealers’ market exposures vary with the market factors and, hence, a pos-
sible price-dependent trading strategy.
For all factors but interest rates, the six banks’ rolling factor coeﬃcients
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est rate factor, the banks’ rolling factor coeﬃcients tend to vary inversely
with the level of the interest rate. This would be consistent with the interest
rate durations for their trading portfolios becoming larger (smaller) when
rates are declining (rising).
The samples for the factor regressions include many days when factor
changes are small. However, the conclusions are basically the same if we re-
strict the analysis to days of large price movements. The banks’ trading rev-
enues do not show a common systematic relation with large price changes
for the noninterest rate factors, but trading revenues tend to be abnormally
low on days of relatively large interest rate increases.
In sum, our principal ﬁndings are: signiﬁcant heterogeneity across deal-
ers in their market exposures, relatively small exposures on average, and a
limited range of long or short exposures. Commonality in dealer exposures
is limited to interest rate risk, with exposure levels inversely related to the
level of rates. The implications of these results for aggregate bank dealer risk
and market stability are discussed in the concluding section of the paper.
The remaining sections are as follows. In the next section, the bank data
and the distribution of trading revenues are described. The factor model
framework and empirical model speciﬁcations are developed in section
2.3. The estimation and results for the random coeﬃcient model are pre-
sented in section 2.4, the rolling regressions in section 2.5, and the relation
between trading revenues and large market price changes in section 2.6.
2.2 Bank Trading Revenues
The Basel Market Risk Amendment (MRA) sets capital requirements
for the market risk of bank holding companies with large trading opera-
tions. The capital requirements are based on the banks’ internal 99th per-
centile VaR forecasts with a one-day horizon. Banks are required to main-
tain records of daily trading revenue for testing their VaR models. The
daily trading revenue for six large trading banks is used in this study.3
All of the banks in the study meet the Basel MRA “large trader” crite-
rion and are subject to market risk capital requirements. Four of the six
banks are among the largest derivatives dealers worldwide, and the other
two are among the largest in the United States. The six trading banks and
the sample periods for each bank were selected so as to exclude banks or
periods for which there was a major merger, which could substantially
change the size and mix of trading. So as not to reveal dollar magnitudes,
trading revenues are divided by the sample standard deviations of the re-
spective banks’ trading revenues.
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3. The six banks were studied in Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002), using a shorter sample pe-
riod.Trading revenues are for the consolidated bank holding company and
include gains and losses on trading positions, fee and spread income from
customer transactions, and net interest income. Trading positions are re-
quired to be marked-to-market daily. Some smoothing of daily valuations
is possible, although this would conﬂict with mark-to-market accounting
rules. In this study, pricing inaccuracies are necessarily treated as a resid-
ual item. An attempt is made to represent the eﬀects of fee and spread in-
come and net interest income on trading revenues using proxy variables.
In ﬁgure 2.1, kernel densities for the banks’ trading revenues (divided by
trading revenue standard deviations) are presented. A normal distribution
having the same means and standard deviations as the banks’ distributions
is provided for reference. Descriptive statistics are presented in table 2.1.
As ﬁgure 2.1 and table 2.1 show, trading revenues are typically positive. For
the median bank, mean daily trading revenues equal .78 trading revenue
standard deviations. As shown in the bottom of table 2.1, losses occurred
on less than 20 percent of trading days for any bank. The typically positive
trading revenues likely reﬂect the importance of fee and spread income and
net interest income.
The trading revenue distributions also have high peaks and heavy tails,
as revealed in ﬁgure 2.1 and by the excess kurtosis statistics in table 2.1. The
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Fig. 2.1 Densities for bank trading revenues5 percent and 95 percent quantiles for the banks’ trading revenues in the
bottom panel of table 2.1 lie inside 5 percent and 95 percent quantiles,
which would be consistent with a normal distribution. The 1 percent and
99 percent and the 0.05 percent and 99.5 percent quantiles lie outside
quantiles consistent with a normal distribution. There also is no indication
of any common skewness in the banks’ trading revenue distributions.
To provide more information on the heavy tails, the lowest and highest
10 percent returns for each bank are plotted by historical dates in ﬁgure
2.2. The plotted values are expressed as deviations from trading revenue
means and are divided by sample standard deviations. With some excep-
tions for bank 1, the lowest 10 percent returns are all losses. Several fea-
tures of ﬁgure 2.2 are notable.
One is that, while there is temporal clustering in both high and low re-
turns, the clustering tends to be greater for low returns. This asymmetry in
temporal clustering may be due to periodic large fees earned by dealers
from customer transactions that are more evenly dispersed through time.
In contrast, low returns are likely to reﬂect mostly portfolio losses from ad-
verse market moves and persistency in market volatility (operational costs
are not included in trading revenues).
A second and related feature of ﬁgure 2.2 is that all of the banks en-
countered loss clustering, with some also experiencing positive spikes, dur-
ing the market turmoil in the late summer and fall of 1998. The market in-
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Table 2.1 Daily trading revenue descriptive statistics
No. of  Excess
Bank Dates obs. Mean kurtosis Skewness
1 Jan. 1998–Dec. 2000 762 1.05 10.75 –0.60
2 Jan. 1998–Sept. 2000 711 0.79 4.82 0.16
3 Jan. 1998–Sept. 2001 1524 0.77 13.13 1.49
4 Jan. 1998–Dec. 2003 1544 0.90 4.17 0.46
5 Jan. 1998–Dec. 2003 1551 0.62 6.46 –0.62
6 Jan. 1998–June 2002 1166 0.72 79.64 –3.98
Quantiles
Loss rate 0.005 0.01 0.05 0.95 0.99 0.995
1 0.074 –2.29 –1.83 –0.22 2.72 3.77 4.15
2 0.132 –3.05 –1.98 –0.63 2.39 3.93 5.15
3 0.146 –2.99 –2.18 –0.60 2.24 3.11 3.89
4 0.111 –1.83 –1.63 –0.54 2.71 4.08 4.57
5 0.188 –3.41 –2.45 –0.84 2.15 3.40 4.15
6 0.147 –1.87 –1.40 –0.55 2.16 3.49 3.90
Notes: Trading revenues in both panels are divided by bank’s sample standard deviations.
Loss rate is the fraction of days when reported trading revenues were negative.Estimating Bank Trading Risk 65
stability during this period had important common eﬀects on the banks’
trading revenues. For all six banks, daily averages of trading revenues for
the second half of 1998 were low and this period had a large eﬀect on the
full sample trading revenue kurtosis for banks 1, 2, 3, and especially 6.4
It should be noted that variation in dealer positions is also a potentially
4. For the second half of 1998, daily averages of trading revenues for banks 1 to 6 were re-
spectively 0.55, 0.39, 0.22, 0.15, 0.15, and 0.39. If the second half of 1998 is excluded from the
sample, the excess kurtosis for banks 1 through 6 are respectively 4.30, 2.63, 2.84, 4.42, 6.07,
and 4.64. See table 2.1 for comparable statistics for the full-period samples.
Fig. 2.2 Trading revenues: 10 percent lowest and highest values
Notes: Values are expressed as deviations from the banks’ sample means and in terms of the
sample standard deviations. The large negative spike for bank 6 exceeds 10 standard devi-
ations.important determinant of the trading return distribution. The dependency
of the trading return distribution on the dynamic management of positions
under a VaR constraint is a major feature in Basak and Shapiro (2001).
Table 2.2 presents cross-bank correlations for daily trading revenues
above the diagonal and, for comparison, cross-bank daily VaR correla-
tions below the diagonal. The trading revenue correlations are all positive
and signiﬁcant using a standard t-test. The potential contribution of ex-
posures to market factors on the trading revenue correlations is considered
in the following. In contrast, the bank VaR correlations show no common
pattern, as correlations are both positive and negative and vary widely.
2.3 Factor Model with Varying Positions
A factor model framework when positions are variable is developed here
and is used to guide the empirical speciﬁcations. Consider a portfolio with
positions in K risky securities and a risk-free asset. Positions in securities
and the risk-free asset may be long or short and include those held indi-
rectly through derivatives. For measuring the portfolio’s sensitivity to mar-
ket factors, bid-ask spreads are abstracted from and the values of short or
long positions are measured at a single price, for example, the midmarket
price. The portfolio can be adjusted continuously, but returns are observed
only for discrete time units.
Let t denote time measured in discrete units. At the start of t, the bank
holds an amount x0
kt in risky security categories k   1, {. . .}, K and x0
0t in
the risk-free asset, which are referred to as the bank’s positions. Positions
may be carried over from t – 1 or new positions may be set at the start of t
prior to any price changes since t – 1. Positions and prices measured at the
end of period t are denoted by xk(t), x0(t), and pk(t). The price of the risk-
free asset is ﬁxed at 1. Using this notation, the values of the portfolio at the
start of t and at the end of t are respectively
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Table 2.2 Cross-bank trading revenue correlations and VAR (trading revenue above
the diagonal and VAR below the diagonal)
Bank
Bank 12345 6
1 0.415 0.210 0.182 0.028 0.145
2 –0.027 0.112 0.070 0.158 0.147
3 0.99 –0.151 0.243 0.169 0.145
4 0.060 –0.812 0.130 0.048 0.146
5 –0.119 0.684 0.097 –0.503 0.094





ktpk(t   1)   x0
0t
(1b) W(t)  ∑
K
k 1
xk(t)pk(t   1)     x0(t).
For the factor model, we want to express the 1-period change in the port-
folio value as a function of 1-period changes in market prices rk(t)  [pk(t) –
pk(t – 1)]/pk(t – 1). If positions are ﬁxed, the change in the portfolio value
will be determined by the 1-period market price changes. However, if posi-
tions are variable, the change in the portfolio value can be aﬀected by intra-
period price movements not revealed in the 1-period price changes. Thus,
the suitability of a factor model when portfolio values are observed only
discretely requires restrictions on intraperiod position and/or possibly
price changes. A highly simplifying assumption made here is that intra-
period changes in security positions and prices are uniform over the pe-
riod. This assumption becomes accurate for very short periods and it may
be a reasonable approximation for one-day returns. It implies that the
intraperiod position and price changes can be measured from the full pe-
riod changes.
A second assumption is made to avoid complications from outside cash
infusions or withdrawals: there are no exogenous intraperiod capital ﬂows
to the portfolio, and intraperiod cash payments and accrued interest on po-
sitions are accumulated in a separate account. Under this assumption,
changes in positions at any time   within period t, dxkt( ), made at prices
pkt( ), will satisfy a self-ﬁnancing constraint: ΣK
k 1dxkt( )pkt( )  dx0t( )  0.
Using the self-ﬁnancing constraint and (1), the change in the portfolio
value over the period, w(t)   W(t) – W 0(t), is
(2) w(t)  ∑
K
k 1 x0
ktpk(t   1)    xk(t)pk(t   1) rk(t),
where  xk(t) is the change in the position over period t (see appendix).
Note that x0
ktpk(t – 1)  [1/2 xk(t)pk(t – 1)] is the average position in the pe-
riod valued at the price of k at the end of t – 1.
The change in the portfolio value can be expressed using a factor model
form:




where V k(t)   [x0
k(t)   1/2 xk(t)]pk(t – 1). Vk(t) is the value of the portfolio
position in factor k and measures the portfolio’s exposure to factor shock
rk(t). Unlike the standard factor model assumption, the factor exposures
are not constant. With daily data, they would reﬂect time-varying daily av-
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tionary process with mean V   k. Further, the positions’ values, V k(t), are as-
sumed to be independent of market factor changes and mutually indepen-
dent. Under these conditions, the portfolio return in equation (3) satisﬁes
the random coeﬃcient models developed in Hildreth and Houck (1968).
With V   kas the mean position value in factor kand vk(t)  V k(t) – V   kas the
random change in the position value, the details of the factor model can be
expressed by
(4a) w(t)   ∑
K
k 1
rk(t)V   k   u(t)




(4c) E[w(t)]   ∑
K
k 1
 k(t)V   k









where  k   E[rk(t)] is the expected change in the market price represented
by factor k,   vkvk is the variance for factor position k;   ww is the uncondi-
tional variance of changes in the value of the portfolio, and  kl is the co-
variance (variance) for individual factors rk(t) and rl(t). For the following
analysis, it is assumed that  k   0.
Equation (4a) expresses the change in the value of the portfolio as the
sum of change in value conditioned on average positions and the change in
value conditioned on the positions’ realized random components, the lat-
ter being deﬁned in equation (4b). Equations (4c) and (4d) are the portfo-
lio’s unconditional mean change and variance. The unconditional variance
is the sum of the variances for ΣK
k 1 rk(t)V   k and u(t). The variance is the sum
of the factor variances and covariances weighted by the mean positions plus
the sum of the products of the factor variances and position variances.
Thus, with variable positions, the volatility of positions interacts with the
volatility of the factors in determining the dispersion of portfolio returns.
The factor model in equations (4a)–(4d) also provides for the correlation
between the changes in banks’ iand jportfolio values that come from mar-
ket factor shocks. This correlation represents a measure of cross-bank
commonality in market risks. Using subscripts for banks i and j, we have
(see appendix)
(5)  wiwj    w ˆiw ˆj  RSi    RSj      uiuj 1   R  Si    1   R  Sj  ,
where wi(t)   w ˆi(t)   ui(t), w ˆi(t)   r(t)V   i and ui(t) is the residual for bank i
in equation (4b).
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risks.  w ˆiw ˆj is the correlation between changes in i and j’s portfolio values
when factor exposures are conditioned on the mean positions. One source
of commonality is similar mean positions, which would make  w ˆiw ˆj positive.
 uiujis the correlation associated with the variation in positions, as reﬂected
in ui(t) and uj(t). A second source is common variation in positions. RSiand
RSj determine the relative importance of these two sources of correlated
returns. RSi is the (population) R-square from a regression of i’s portfolio
value changes on market factors with factor coeﬃcients set at their means
(RSi    w ˆiw ˆj/ wiwj).
Using the random coeﬃcient model and with observations on trading
portfolio value changes and market factors, it is possible to estimate the
bank dealers’ average factor positions and their variances and some com-
ponents of the cross-bank correlations.
The assumptions, of course, are restrictive and limit the generality of re-
sults. The assumption that position changes are mutually independent is
one of notational convenience but potentially important for empirical tract-
ability if there are many factors. Dropping this assumption would require
recognizing all the covariances between position changes in equation (4d).
Assuming that market exposures are independent of factor changes is
particularly limiting because portfolio management may be related to mar-
ket price movements. As discussed earlier, such policies have been said to
adversely aﬀect market stability. Dropping the assumption of independ-
ence has important eﬀects on the factor model formulation and, speciﬁ-
cally, can make portfolio returns nonlinear in the factor changes, rk(t).
An illustration of this is when the portfolio is managed such that returns
resemble a call or put option on, say, security k. The optionlike portfolio
implies a position in the security and a cash position. Changes in the secu-
rity price have both ﬁrst-order and higher-order eﬀects on the portfolio re-
turn. The higher-order eﬀects imply changes in the security and cash posi-
tions that are related to the factor price change. For security k,  xk(t) in
equation (2) is positive and depends on the price change, rk(t). A second-
degree polynomial provides a second-order approximation to the eﬀect of
the market factor on the portfolio value.
(6) w(t)   a0
k(t)rk(t)   b0
k(t)[rk(t)]2
The coeﬃcient for the linear component in equation (6) is analogous to the
option’s delta and that for the quadratic component to the option’s gamma.
Nonlinear portfolio return equations such as (6) and returns expressed
as functions of traded option values have been used in hedge fund studies
to capture positions that vary with market returns.5 However, a particular
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5. Chan et al. (2005) use higher-order polynomials in market factors to capture nonlinear-
ity in hedge fund returns. Agarwal and Naik (2004) use returns to call and put options as theportfolio strategy, including the strategy horizon, is needed to specify or in-
terpret a particular functional form. For example, the strategy speciﬁed in
the preceding illustration implies that the squared market factor in equa-
tion (6) reﬂects the nonlinear sensitivity of the portfolio to the market fac-
tor, that is, the option’s “gamma.” Without this speciﬁcation, the interpre-
tation of the squared factor would be ambiguous (e.g., it might represent
the sensitivity of the portfolio value to market volatility). Further, the co-
eﬃcients a0
k(t) and b0
k(t) expressed in equation (6) are for period t. They de-
pend on the security value at the start of the period and also the portfolio
management horizon (option’s time to expiration). Treating the two coeﬃ-
cients as constants implies that the portfolio is being rebalanced to a con-
stant composition and horizon at the start of each sample observation, for
example, each month if observations are monthly.
We have little speciﬁc information on bank dealers’ portfolio strategies
and we are not testing a speciﬁc strategy. This lack of speciﬁcity includes
the time dimension of the dealer’s strategy as it relates to our daily obser-
vation period.
A less formal approach to price-dependent strategies is taken here. For
each bank, we estimate a linear regression of trading revenues on market
factor changes (and nonmarket factor variables) with 150-day daily rolling
samples. For the six banks, the estimated rolling coeﬃcients are plotted
along with coincidental 150-day rolling means for the respective factors
(factor price levels, not changes). The 150-day rolling means will reﬂect pe-
riods of rising or declining market prices. Of interest is whether the rolling
factor coeﬃcients move systematically with the factors. This would in-
dicate dealers’ market exposures vary with the market factors and, hence,
a possible price-dependent strategy. The signiﬁcance of any comovement
will be judged according to whether it is common among the six banks.
While observed comovement between the factor coeﬃcients and the
factors would indicate that the dealers’ market exposures are related to 
the market factors, this may still not uniquely identify the price-dependent
portfolio strategy. We consider this issue in evaluating the rolling regres-
sion results.
Before presenting the empirical factor models, the treatment of other
components of trading revenues needs to be mentioned. (1) Portfolio rev-
enues include accrued and explicit interest payments and payments for
risk-bearing. (2) Trading revenues also includes fee and spread income
from market-making. We do not have direct measures of these additional
components. Proxy variables are used to capture the eﬀects of trading vol-
ume and net interest income on dealer trading revenues. (3) Portfolio rev-
enues also are aﬀected by (interperiod) changes in the portfolio’s capital.
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factors in hedge fund factor regressions to capture the nonlinearity between the hedge fund’s
returns and the underlying market factors that arise from option-type trading strategies.
Mitchel and Pulvino (2001) apply a piecewise linear factor model in returns to risk arbitrage
strategies.Changes in the capital of the portfolio are not explicitly accounted for
other than what can be represented by a trend variable.
2.4 Random Coeﬃcient Model
We ﬁrst describe the explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis.
2.4.1 Explanatory Variables
In selecting market factors, four broad market categories are repre-
sented: exchange rates, interest rates, equity, and credit spreads. For ex-
change rates, equities, and credit spreads multiple factors are used for each
category. A ten-year U.S. Treasury rate is used to capture interest rate risk
in the trading portfolio. In an earlier version, a ten-year rate and a three-
month rate were used, with qualitatively similar coeﬃcients estimated for
both factors. There are a total of eleven market factors, which are identi-
ﬁed in panel A of table 2.3 with descriptive statistics.
For exchange rate factors, regional exchange rate indices were con-
structed. They are weighted averages of log changes in individual country
exchange rates. The exception is Russia, the only Eastern Europe country
for which we had historical data. The weights are shown in panel B of table
2.3. They were constructed from worldwide dealer foreign exchange (FX)
spot and derivatives turnover reported in Bank of International Settle-
ments (BIS) Central Bank Surveys in 1998 and 2001.
Exchange rate and equity factors are measured as log diﬀerences; inter-
est rate and credit spread factors are ﬁrst diﬀerences. For the exchange rate
and equity market factors, positive diﬀerences indicate increases in asset
values and, for the interest rate and credit spreads, positive diﬀerences in-
dicate decreases in asset values.
In addition to the market factors, a proxy variable is used to represent
trading volume that generates fee and spread income. We do not have di-
rect information on dealers’ daily transactions and use detrended daily vol-
ume on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) plus NASDAQ to repre-
sent a market volume inﬂuence on trading revenue. Also, we do not have
data on net interest income from trading positions. To proxy for net inter-
est income, we use a monthly lagged moving average of the ten-year U.S.
Treasury rate. This is intended to represent the gradual realization in the
portfolio of upward and downward movements in interest rate levels.
A trend variable is used to capture any trend in the level of the bank’s ac-
tivity. Lagged trading revenue is also included. If dealers smooth position
revaluations, this could produce serially correlated returns.
2.4.2 Market Risk Estimates
We use the generalized least squares (GLS) random coeﬃcient estimators
developed by Hildreth and Houck (1968) to estimate the banks’ mean expo-
sures to the market factors, V   k, shown in equation (4a), and the exposure



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.variances,  vkvk, shown in equations (4d) and (4e).6 For the estimation we
are assuming that vk(t) is i.i.d. independent of the market factors, and that
vk(t) and vl(t) are independent for k   l. The residual in the trading revenue
equation will include the residual that arises from random position
changes, that is, u(t) in equation (4b), as well as any independent sources of
trading revenue not accounted for in the model. Under these assumptions,
Hildreth and Houck provide unbiased and consistent estimators of the
mean coeﬃcients and coeﬃcient variances. Here, we allow only the eleven
market factors to have variable coeﬃcients.
Appendix tables 2A.1 and 2A.2 contain the detailed regression results.
Reported coeﬃcients are estimated using trading revenues divided by
sample standard deviations and thus measure trading revenue eﬀects in
terms of trading revenue standard deviations. The estimates are discussed
here using several summary tables. In the top part of table 2.4, summary
statistics for the regressions estimating mean exposures to the market fac-
tors and including other regressors are presented. As shown, the full set of
regressors has signiﬁcant explanatory power based on F-values and re-
gression R-squares. However, the F-values measuring the joint explana-
tory power for the eleven market factors are not very high and do not ex-
ceed the 0.05 critical value for two banks. Thus the market factors do not
have a lot of explanatory power (excluding these factors from the regres-
sions, causes the R-squares to drop by about four basis points). Since the
factor coeﬃcients reﬂect the estimated mean factor exposures, this implies
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6. Speciﬁcally, we use (14), p. 587, to estimate the coeﬃcient variances and   ˜ estimator in
(25), p. 589, to estimate the mean market factor positions.




Regression R2 0.18 0.15 0.22 0.32 0.15 0.07
Regression F-values 10.09 7.64 27.44 45.36 17.93 5.33
Market factor F-values 1.84 1.05 2.36 7.93 0.97 1.88
Sample size (n) 728 681 1,484 1,485 1,483 1,109
Coefﬁcient variance regressionsb
Regression R2 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.02
Regression F-values 3.82 13.73 11.07 4.16 5.59 1.98
Sample size (n) 728 681 1,484 1,485 1,483 1,109
a.05 critical F-values: for regression F(16,n– 16) = 1.65; for market factors F(11,n– 16) = 1.80.
b.05 critical F-values: F(12,n – 12) = 1.76.that average market exposures cannot account for much of the variability
of trading revenues.
In contrast, equity volume, used as a proxy for market transactions vol-
ume, is positive for all banks and highly signiﬁcant for all but one bank (ap-
pendix table 2A.1). Trading revenues also have a signiﬁcant positive trend.
The estimated coeﬃcients for the moving-average interest rate (to proxy in-
terest income) and lagged trading revenue have mixed signs and signiﬁ-
cance across the banks.
The bottom part of table 2.4 presents summary statistics for the regres-
sions estimating the variances of the market factor coeﬃcients. While R-
squares are low, the F-values are highly signiﬁcant, implying signiﬁcant
variability in the market factor coeﬃcients. The estimator used for the vari-
ances of the market factor coeﬃcients is unbiased under the model as-
sumptions. While Hildreth and Houck suggest constraining the coeﬃcient
estimates to nonnegative values (pp. 587–89), this constraint was not im-
posed here. A little more than a third of the estimated coeﬃcients are neg-
ative, although only two are signiﬁcant at a 0.05 level and one at a 0.01 level
(appendix table 2A.2). We regard the negative coeﬃcients as reﬂecting
sampling error and exclude them in evaluating the variability of the deal-
ers’ market exposures. We have no reason to believe that this biases our in-
terpretation of the results.
In table 2.5, two measures of the dealers’ potential exposures to large
market factor shocks are constructed using appendix tables 2A.1 and 2A.2.
The top number in each cell is equal to the respective factor’s coeﬃcient
from table 2A.1—the estimate of the bank’s mean exposure to the factor—
multiplied by a 2 standard deviation shock to the factor. Recall that the 
coeﬃcient estimates measure trading revenue eﬀects in terms of trading
revenue standard deviations. Hence, the top number in the cell measures
trading revenue eﬀects in terms of trading revenue standard deviations
from a 2 standard deviation factor shock.
The two numbers underneath are the 2.5 percent and 97.5 percent esti-
mated quantiles for factor exposures, that is, 95 percent intervals. The
quantile estimates use the estimated mean coeﬃcients (table 2A.1) and co-
eﬃcient variances (table 2A.2), and assume the coeﬃcients are normally
distributed. The quantile estimates also are multiplied by 2 standard devi-
ation factor shocks. The italic numbers indicate where coeﬃcient variance
estimates are negative (a zero interval is reported but is not used in the fol-
lowing analysis).
Consider ﬁrst the estimated mean factor exposures (the top number in
each cell). The estimates are small compared to the mean trading revenues
shown in table 2.1. For all factors, a 2 standard deviation market factor
shock produces less than a 0.3 standard deviation change in a bank’s trad-
ing revenue and less than a 0.1 standard deviation change in trading revenue
for two-thirds of the factors. For the median bank, mean trading revenues



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.equal 0.78 standard deviations. Thus, 2 standard deviation shocks to indi-
vidual factors and even to multiple factors would still leave a positive ex-
pected trading revenue.
Among individual market categories, the estimated mean exposures for
the interest rate factor are negative for ﬁve of six banks. The negative expo-
sures would imply bank dealers have (small) net long exposures to interest
rate changes on average; that is, the portfolio duration is positive. For the
three other broad market categories, however, there does not appear to be a
clear pattern of directional mean exposures to these market categories, al-
though coeﬃcients are mostly positive for the Western Europe exchange in-
dex. Generally, the coeﬃcients vary in sign across broad market categories
for a given bank and for the most part across banks for a given factor.
Now consider the estimated 95-percentile intervals for the market factor
exposures reported under the mean exposure estimates in table 2.5. The
interval estimates cover both positive and negative values, indicating that
factor exposures can vary between long and short positions. Also, for the
factor variances with nonnegative estimates, the 95 percent coeﬃcient
bounds are large relative to the estimated mean coeﬃcients. However, the
bounds do not appear to be particularly large when measured against the
trading revenue quantiles shown in the bottom panel of table 2.1.
Speciﬁcally, the 95 percent bounds in table 2.5 measure potential trad-
ing revenue variation from 2 standard deviation market factor shocks.
Conditioned on a 2 standard deviation factor shock, they represent 95 per-
cent bounds on portfolio gains and losses. The trading revenue quantiles in
table 2.1 measure trading revenue variation due to market factor shocks
and variation from other inﬂuences, such as market-making revenues. The
bounds in table 2.5 tend to be within the 1 percent and 99 percent quantiles
for trading revenues shown in table 2.1. Also, the bounds in table 2.5 are for
2 standard deviation market factor shocks. Thus, trading revenues condi-
tioned on estimates of relatively large factor exposures and factor shocks
do not produce extreme outliers relative to the unconditional variability of
the trading revenues.
Overall, the results from the random coeﬃcient model do not indicate
that bank dealers take large market risks relative to the size of average trad-
ing revenues and trading revenue volatility, and there is signiﬁcant cross-
dealer heterogeneity in exposures. However, at times dealers may still have
large exposures to particular factors, creating the potential for signiﬁcant
losses on days of extreme market conditions.
2.4.3 Cross-Bank Trading Revenue Correlations
As described earlier in section 2.2, cross-bank trading revenues show
small but consistently positive correlations (table 2.2). As shown in equa-
tion (5), cross-bank trading return correlation due to market risk expo-
sures can come from dealers either having common average exposures to
76 James O’Brien and Jeremy Berkowitzmarket factors or common variation in exposures. Based on the random
coeﬃcient regression results, average factor exposures seem unlikely to be
an important source of cross-bank trading revenue correlation. This can be
determined by applying the mean and variance estimates of the random co-
eﬃcients for the market factors to estimate  w ˆiw ˆj RSi   RSj   in equation (5)
for banks’ i and j.7 The cross-bank correlation component reﬂecting posi-
tions at their mean values was calculated for each pair of banks. For all but
one bank this component is less than 0.02 (for banks 2 and 4, it is –0.04).
If market exposures account for most of the observed trading revenue
correlations, it must be mainly due to common changes in banks’ expo-
sures; that is, the component  uiuj 1 – RS  i   1 – RS  j   in equation (5). To de-
termine this component requires estimates of the variable exposure com-
ponent ui(t) in each bank’s residual revenue (equation [4b]). The best that
can be done is to use the factor model regression residuals for ui(t) to cal-
culate  uiuj  1 – RS  i    1 – RS  j   for each combination of banks. Unfortu-
nately, the regression residuals will include both ui(t) and other unspeciﬁed
components of trading revenues.
Nonetheless, correlations reported in the bottom panel of table 2.6 were
obtained by calculating  uiuj 1–RS  i   1–RS  j   using the regression equa-
tion residuals (correlations above the diagonal are the trading revenue cor-
relations displayed in table 2.2). The correlations below the diagonal typi-
cally are slightly more than half the trading revenue correlations above the
diagonal. Whether the former represent a small commonality in trading
revenue due to common market exposures or due to other common inﬂu-
ences on trading revenues not controlled for in the regressions is diﬃcult 
to say. Employing diﬀerent approaches, further consideration is given to
dealer commonality in market exposures in the next two sections.
2.5 Rolling Regressions
In this section, we present estimates of market factor coeﬃcients for
daily rolling regressions. Using ordinary least squares (OLS), each bank’s
trading revenue is regressed on the market factors and other explanatory
variables, including our proxy variables for trading volume and net inter-
est payment eﬀects on trading revenues. The rolling window is 150 days.
The ﬁrst 150-day regression ends on August 11, 1998 (August 14, 1998, for
bank 1). The regression equations are reestimated daily, dropping the last
day and adding a new day using each bank’s available sample period.
In ﬁgures 2.3–2.6, plots of rolling coeﬃcients that are representative of
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7.  w ˆiw ˆj is generated by historically simulating w ˆi for each bank, using the estimated factor 
coeﬃcients and historical factor data. For RSi    w ˆiw ˆi/ wiwi,  w ˆiw ˆj is similarly obtained.  wiwi
can be generated from equation (4.e) in the text, using the estimated factor coeﬃcients for 
V   k, the sample factor variances for  kk, and the estimated factor coeﬃcient variances used 
for   vkvk.78 James O’Brien and Jeremy Berkowitz
the results for the diﬀerent broad market categories are presented along
with 150-day coincidental moving averages of the respective factors. The
coeﬃcients for each factor are in the same units as the random coeﬃcient
model estimates in appendix table 2A.1 (average values of the rolling co-
eﬃcients are of the same order of magnitude as those in the random coeﬃ-
cient model in table 2A.1). The rolling means of factors are expressed as
factor levels (not diﬀerences). They show large ranges of variation over the
sample period, which includes a business cycle peak in March 2000 and a
trough in November 2001. The interest rate, equity, and credit spread fac-
tors (Baa and high yield) show evidence of business cycle inﬂuences.
Our interest is in whether the rolling coeﬃcients vary systematically with
the factors, which would indicate that the dealers’ market exposures are re-
lated to market prices.
Consider ﬁrst the coeﬃcients for the interest rate factor plotted in ﬁgure
2.3. The coeﬃcients for all but bank 4 show a rising and declining pattern
that roughly tracks the rising and declining interest rate pattern. The pat-
tern implies a tendency for the portfolio’s interest rate exposure to move in-
versely with interest rates to the point where exposures may go from long
to short or short to long.
This pattern would be consistent with dealers’ reducing net long posi-
tions in longer-term securities when interest rates are rising, even to the
point of taking short positions. When interest rates decline, dealers in-
crease their net long positions so that, in low interest rate environments,
they tend to have relatively large interest rate exposures.
A more passive strategy also might be consistent with the results in ﬁg-
ure 2.3. As shown in equation (3), the factor coeﬃcients measure factor ex-
posures in terms of position values. Rather than actively alter positions,
dealers might have simply held their same positions and allowed position
values to deteriorate, even becoming negative, as rates increased (prices de-
Table 2.6 Cross-bank trading revenue correlation due to market factors
(unconditional trading revenue correlations above diagonal; correlations
due to market factors below diagonal)
Bank
Bank 1 2 3456
1 0.415 0.21 0.182 0.028 0.145
2 0.301 0.112 0.070 0.158 0.147
3 0.139 0.064 0.243 0.169 0.145
4 –0.011 –0.028 0.138 0.048 0.146
5 0.029 0.121 0.042 0.017 0.094
6 0.123 0.107 0.056 0.063 0.045
Notes: The cross-bank correlations due to market factors were calculated using equation (5).
For details of the calculations, see the explanation in text.clined) and then increase as rates subsequently declined. Against this ex-
planation, however, market analysts suggested that dealers were increasing
their long-term positions as interest rates declined to low levels in the early
2000s.8
Aside from the explanation for the rolling interest rate coeﬃcients, it is
shown in table 2.7 that cross-bank correlations for the coeﬃcients are all
positive. This reinforces the impression from ﬁgure 2.3 of common varia-
tion in the dealers’ interest rate exposures.
For the most part, the rolling coeﬃcients for the other factors do not
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8. See Financial Timesarticle by Jenny Wiggins, March 11, 2004. Also see Adrian and Flem-
ing (2005), p. 4.
Fig. 2.3 Interest rate regression coeﬃcients and moving-average interest rateshow any clear patterns of comovement with their respective factors that
are common to all or most banks. In ﬁgures 2.4 and 2.5,plots are presented
for the rolling coeﬃcients and factors for the NYSE and high yield spreads.
These results are representative of results for the other factors as well, ex-
cluding the Russian ruble (see the following). For some individual banks,
comovement is observed between the coeﬃcients and factors—for ex-
ample, the NYSE rolling coeﬃcients and NYSE factor for bank 2. Whether
this represents an underlying relationship for a particular bank or just a
chance realization of the data can’t be determined. Nonetheless, for the non-
interest rate factors, the results do not indicate any covariation between the
factor exposures and the factors that is common among the dealers.
Something of an exception to these results is the behavior of the Russian
ruble coeﬃcients shown in ﬁgure 2.6. For all six banks, the coeﬃcients
move toward zero in late August and early September 1998 as the ruble de-
clined precipitously. The estimated coeﬃcients remain close to zero until
mid-1999 (several months after the August–October 1998 period passed
out of the rolling samples). This behavior would be consistent for the banks
becoming insulated against the ruble.9
2.6 Dealer Trading Revenues on Days of Large Market Moves
The results from the two-factor model approaches suggest that, in the
aggregate, bank dealers are not consistently on one side of the market,
except possibly for (default-free) interest rate exposures. However, as de-
scribed in section 2.2, all six banks had abnormally low, though still mostly
positive, trading revenues in the latter part of 1998. This was a period that
included both high market volatility and sharp declines in credit and other
risky asset prices and increases in U.S. Treasury security prices. In a ﬁnal
exercise, we look to see whether dealer trading revenues might be com-
monly related to price movements on days of large price changes. This may
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9. While diﬃcult to see in the ﬁgure, prior to convergence to zero, the rolling coeﬃcients
across the six banks were quite diﬀerent and included both positive and negative coeﬃcient
values, implying long and short exposures in the ruble. Note also that the volatility of the
ruble (measured as absolute daily log changes) remained above pre-August 1998 levels over
the rest of the year and into the ﬁrst half of 1999.
Table 2.7 Cross-bank correlations for rolling regression coefﬁcients
xwe xru xap xsa nyse nasdaq r10yr Baa hy yld swap embi
Median correlation 0.09 0.03 0.18 0.28 0.18 0.20 0.74 0.16 0.59 0.25 0.13
Percent positive 
correlation 53 53 53 67 73 60 100 60 80 67 67
Note: There are 15 cross-bank correlations for each market factor.not be evident in the factor model regressions based on the full samples
where, on many days, price changes are small.
For simplicity, days of relatively large price increases and, separately,
price declines are identiﬁed only for the broad market categories—ex-
change rate, equity, interest rate, and credit. For each market factor, days
where factor shocks fall into the ﬁrst quintile and the ﬁfth quintile are sep-
arately sorted. For a market category, a large market decline day (or a large
market increase day) is deﬁned as a day when at least one factor in the cat-
egory is in the ﬁrst (the ﬁfth) quintile and none is in the ﬁfth (the ﬁrst) quin-
tile. For example, a day when the change in the NYSE index is in the ﬁrst
quintile and the NASDAQ index is not in the ﬁfth quintile is a large equity
market decline day. Typically, when one factor in a market category expe-
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Fig. 2.4 NYSE regression coeﬃcients and moving-average NYSE indexriences a large change, other factor(s) in that category change in the same
direction, although this is less true for exchange rates (further description
of the large factor changes is provided in table 2.8). Large market move
days span the entire six-year sample period, but with a higher frequency in
the second half of 1998.
Mean and median bank trading revenues for low and high market return
days for each of the four market categories are reported in table 2.8. Except
for the interest rate category, mean and median trading revenues for the six
banks on low return days in each of the other market categories are not
uniformly lower, or higher, than on high return days. For these market cat-
egories, this comparison does not indicate that dealers’ market exposures
bear a common systematic relation to market prices. For the interest rate
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Fig. 2.5 High-yield regression coeﬃcients and moving-average high-yield spreadcategory, on days of large rate increases, trading revenues are uniformly
lower across the six banks than on days of large rate declines, suggesting
long (positive duration) interest rate exposures are typical. These results
are consistent with the results from the factor models.
While heterogeneity in exposures will reduce the likelihood of large ag-
gregate dealer losses, the chance realization of losses (or abnormally high
returns) for a group of dealers is still more likely during a period when
volatility is high across markets. The summer and autumn of 1998 was such
a period, and the higher volatility in the banks’ trading revenues is appar-
ent from f ﬁgure 2.2.10 Nonetheless, with cross-bank heterogeneity in expo-
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10. We also looked at absolute trading revenues on days of high and low absolute changes
in market factors, where absolute values are used to measure the size of daily ﬂuctuations or
volatility. Days of high and low volatility were deﬁned at the market category level using an
analogous procedure to that followed in determining days of large market declines and large
Fig. 2.6 Russian ruble regression coeﬃcients and moving-average exchange ratesures, losses are likely to come from positions in diﬀerent markets. For the
1998 third and fourth quarters, major U.S. bank dealers reported quarterly
losses or low revenues in diﬀerent market categories—interest rate (in-
cluding credit), equity, and commodities.11 For the six banks studied here,
it was also the case that diﬀerent banks reported quarterly losses or low re-
turns in diﬀerent markets.
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Table 2.8 Bank trading revenues conditioned on large one-day market moves
Exchange rate change Interest rate change
Trading revenue: Trading revenue: Trading revenue: Trading revenue:
Mean Median Mean Median
Bank Decline Increase Decline Increase Decline Increase Decline Increase
1 1.14 1.04 1.07 0.97 1.29** 1.00 1.22** 0.90
2 0.87 0.85 0.82 0.78 0.93 0.85 0.82 0.80
3 0.70 0.81 0.70 0.75 0.86** 0.71 0.90* 0.72
4 0.85 0.98** 0.81 0.81 0.95 0.93 0.87 0.78
5 0.60 0.61 0.55 0.59 0.69** 0.57 0.70** 0.55
6 0.63 0.69 0.63 0.68 0.87** 0.63 0.81** 0.64
Equity price change Credit spread changes
Trading revenue: Trading revenue: Trading revenue: Trading revenue:
Mean Median Mean Median
Decline Increase Decline Increase Decline Increase Decline Increase
1 1.17 1.06 1.06 0.89 1.00 1.13 0.93 1.13
2 0.93 0.77 0.86 0.78 0.72** 0.92 0.64** 0.84
3 0.74 0.86 0.78 0.85 0.84 0.73 0.76 0.78
4 0.83 1.20** 0.80 0.93** 1.01 0.91 0.85 0.83
5 0.60 0.51 0.59 0.45 0.68 0.63 0.64 0.61
6 0.82 0.72 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.73 0.66 0.77
Notes: Bank trading revenue is normalized by full sample bank trading revenue standard deviations.
Sample sizes for each of the “Decline” and “Increase” categories range from 167 to 606, with a median
of 323. For individual factors (e.g., NYSE for equity category), their mean values for the “Decline” quin-
tile is 1 to 2 standard deviations below the mean values for the “Increase” quintile. Means test is a stan-
dard difference of two means. Medians test uses the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank sum test for large
samples.
**Signiﬁcant at .05 for the difference between “Decline” and “Increase” day trading revenue mean (me-
dian) values.
increases (table 2.8), except in terms of the size of absolute factor changes. For each of the six
banks, mean and median absolute one-day trading revenues are consistently higher on high
market volatility days than on low market volatility days for all four market categories, with
signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level for almost 75 percent of the mean and median calculations.
11. For large bank dealers, see “Bank Derivatives Report, Fourth Quarter 2001,” Oﬃce of
the Comptroller of the Currency, p. 13. Note that the quarterly revenue reports include fee
and spread income as well as changes in position market values.2.7 Conclusions
To recap the main results, bank dealers do not consistently maintain ex-
posures on one side of the market, with the exception of small average long
exposures to interest rate risk. They vary their exposures in size and direc-
tion but, except for interest rate exposures, the variation is heterogeneous
across the dealers. Interest rate exposures tend to vary inversely with the
level of interest rates. Variation in trading revenues from market exposures
also does not seem large relative to the variation in total trading revenues,
which also include fee, spread, and net interest income.
These results are subject to important limitations imposed by limitations
of the trading revenue data that were used, inherent factor model limita-
tions, and to a small sample of bank dealers. Also, the two-factor modeling
approaches employ diﬀerent underlying assumptions whose consequences
have not been examined. If these limitations are put aside, a number of
points can be made about the relation between dealer market risks, VaR,
and market prices based on the results.
Heterogeneity in dealers’ market exposures reduces the likelihood that
dealers as a group will incur large losses in periods of market stress or that
their aggregate risk-taking behavior contributes signiﬁcantly to a herding
phenomenon. The heterogeneity in exposures also applies to arguments
that dealers’ common use of VaR for risk management leads to herding be-
havior. Shifts in market volatility could produce common changes in deal-
ers’ VaRs and desired risk exposures but without leading to common di-
rectional shifts in risky asset demands because dealers have both short and
long positions. A potential exception is commonality in adjustments to in-
terest rate risk exposures.
While heterogeneity in dealers’ market exposures reduces the likelihood
of large aggregate dealer losses, the chance occurrence of common losses
(or abnormally high returns) among banks is still more likely in a period of
generally high market volatility. The summer and autumn of 1998 was such
a period, when volatility was high across markets and dealers’ losses or low
returns occurred in diﬀerent markets.
Especially during periods of extreme market conditions, there are areas
of dealer activity other than securities trading that may be more important
to ﬁnancial market stability and bank risk. This would include dealers’
market-making role under extreme market conditions. For example, see
Routledge and Zinn (2004), with some empirical evidence on the summer
and autumn of 1998 in Furﬁne and Remolona (2002). Also potentially im-
portant is dealer (including parent bank), credit exposures to hedge funds,
and other important market players. The issue of bank credit exposures to
hedge funds and large market players is taken up in Kho, Lee, and Stulz
(2000), Furﬁne and Remolona (2002), and Chan, Getmansky, Hass, and
Lo (2005).
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Factor Model Derivations
Factor Model Portfolio Value (equation [2])
Here the 1-period change in the value of the portfolio shown in equation
(2) is derived. Two assumptions are used. One is a self-ﬁnancing constraint
within the period, ΣK
k 1 dxkt( )pkt( )   dx0t( )   0. The second is that price
and position changes within the period are uniform: dpkt( )   pk(t)d  and
dxkt( )    xk(t)d  for t – 1    t. The starting position for security k is
x0
kt. The derivation uses continuous price and position changes within the
period. The change in the value of the portfolio is w(t)   W(t) – Wt
0.
Using the above assumptions and notation:
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where rk(t)    pk(t)/pk(t – 1).
Cross-Bank Portfolio Value Correlation Due to Market Factors 
(equation [5])
The correlation in portfolio value changes between bank i and j due to
market factor shocks is derived under the assumptions used for the random
coeﬃcient model presented in equations (4a)–(4d). The following vector
notation is used here: r(t), V i(t), V   i and vi(t) are K   1 vectors of the market
factors, factor coeﬃcients, mean coeﬃcients and random coeﬃcient com-








86 James O’Brien and Jeremy BerkowitzUsing equation (4a) in the text, w(t)   ΣK
k 1 rk(t)V   k   u(t) and equation
(4b), u(t)   ΣK
k 1 rk(t)vk(t), the expected cross-product of returns for banks
i and j, conditioned on r(t), is:
(A.2) E(wi(t)wj(t)⏐r(t)]   Evi,vj{[V   i r(t)   vi (t)r(t)][V   j r(t)   vj (t)r(t)]⏐r(t)},
where Evivj[g(vi, vj)⏐r(t)]  ∫vi1...   ∫vjKg[vi1...,   vjK, r(t)] f [vi1...,   vjK⏐r(t)]dvi1
...,  dvjK. Using E[vi(t)]   0 and independence between vi(t) and r(t), 
Evj[V   i r(t)r (t)vj(t)⏐r(t)]   Evi[v j (t)r(t)r (t)V   j⏐r(t)   0. Using this orthogo-
nality, (A.2) becomes
(A.3) E(wi(t)wj(t)⏐r(t)]   V   i r(t)r (t)V   j   Evi,vj[vi (t)r(t)r (t)vj(t)⏐r(t)]






Since the factor shocks are zero mean, the (unconditional) covariance be-
tween portfolio returns to i and j is  wiwj   E[wiwj]   Er{E[wi(t)wj(t)⏐r(t)]}.
Applying Er{E[wi(t)wj(t)⏐r(t)]} to (A.3) yields












where   E[r(t)r (t)] is the covariance matrix for r(t) and  kl E[rk(t)ri(t)]
the covariance for rk(t) and rl(t). V   i  V   j is the covariance between changes
in bank iand bank j’s portfolio values conditioned on market exposures set
at their mean values. ΣK
k 1 ΣK
l 1  vikvjl kl is the covariance between changes in
i and j’s portfolio values due to the interaction between the random shifts
in the coeﬃcients and the market factors. Note the sign for   vikvjk kk is the
same as that for   vikvjk.
To obtain the correlation coeﬃcient for wi(t) and wj(t), deﬁne   w ˆiw ˆj   V   i 
 V   j and   uiuj   ΣK
k 1 ΣK
l 1   vikvjl kl. Deﬁne  wiwj as the correlation between wi(t)
and wj(t). Using this notation, we can express the various correlations and
covariances between changes in i and j’s portfolio values as follows:
(A.5a)  wiwj    wiwj/  wiwi     wjwj  
(A.5b)   w ˆiw ˆj    w ˆiw ˆj   w ˆiw ˆi     w ˆjw ˆj  
(A.5c)   uiuj    uiuj   w ˆiw ˆi     w ˆjw ˆj  
Also, from equation (A.4), we have   wiwj   w ˆiw ˆi   uiui. Using this result with
the deﬁnitions in equations (A.5a)–(A.5c) gives the unconditional correla-
tion between changes in i and j’s portfolio values, shown in equation (5) in
the text:
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   w ˆiw ˆi RSi   RSj      uiuj 1   R  Si   1   RS  j  .
1    w ˆjw ˆj    wjwj
1    w ˆiw ˆi    wiwi
  w ˆjw ˆj     wjwj
  w ˆiw ˆi    wiwi
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Table 2A.1 Market factor model for bank trading revenue
Bank
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
constant
 0 –0.105 1.152 –0.575 –2.632 1.397 0.422
t-value –0.26 2.81 –2.54 –11.24 5.51 1.44
fx we
 1 5.568 5.652 4.528 6.771 –7.380 5.575
t-value 0.92 0.94 1.02 1.64 –1.52 1.13
fx russia
 2 0.901 1.814 5.011 –0.088 0.605 –1.038
t-value 0.56 0.97 2.57 –0.08 0.35 –0.72
fx asia pac
 3 –17.873 –8.553 –2.006 3.794 2.843 0.550
t-value –3.02 –1.45 –0.47 1.01 0.58 0.13
fx s amer
 4 –3.993 –5.830 –0.506 4.637 –6.527 13.453
t-value –0.60 –0.91 –0.12 1.03 –1.43 2.43
nyse
 5 –5.437 –5.112 2.241 10.230 –6.432 –1.959
t-value –1.19 –1.14 0.79 3.50 –2.06 –0.53
nasdaq
 6 1.855 2.440 0.148 –1.621 0.985 –1.410
t-value 0.92 1.19 0.10 –1.07 0.62 –0.89
10-yr treas
 7 –2.192 0.804 –1.507 –1.618 –0.566 –0.696
t-value –2.23 0.78 –2.38 –2.89 –0.85 –0.99
Baa sprd
 8 –0.593 2.355 –1.184 0.314 –0.305 2.312
t-value –0.41 1.58 –1.30 0.36 –0.31 2.12
hi yld sprd
 9 –0.434 0.059 –0.901 –1.011 –0.200 –1.218
t-value –0.62 0.07 –2.06 –2.46 –0.48 –2.48
swap sprd
 10 –0.268 –0.234 1.181 0.191 0.397 –0.582
t-value –0.21 –0.21 1.53 0.28 0.51 –0.64
embi+ sprd
 11 0.013 0.168 –0.279 –0.722 –0.066 0.097
t-value 0.07 0.86 –2.12 –5.55 –0.44 0.52
equity vol
 12 0.353 0.418 0.223 0.363 0.083 0.236
t-value 3.78 4.21 4.97 8.07 1.71 4.00Estimating Bank Trading Risk 89
10-yr treas  move ave
 13 0.143 –0.124 0.150 0.529 –0.206 0.024
t-value 1.91 –1.60 4.07 13.42 –5.03 0.47
PLt–1
 14 0.142 0.181 0.203 0.227 –0.081 –0.028
t-value 4.03 5.09 8.30 9.65 –3.17 –1.07
trend
 15 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
t-value 3.59 3.45 9.05 12.08 6.71 4.37
F-Stat2 9.236 6.081 22.368 44.293 14.593 4.576
R2 0.172 0.128 0.196 0.325 0.137 0.063
N 728 681 1,484 1,485 1,483 1,109
Notes:Trading revenues are divided by the banks’ sample standard deviations. Equity volume
has been scaled by 1 million. Coefﬁcients are estimated for equation (4.a) in the text with ad-
ditional explanatory variables described in the text. A GLS estimator is used, which is de-




Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Table 2A.2 Estimates of coefﬁcient variances for market factors
Bank
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
constant
 0 0.48 0.40 0.44 0.57 0.56 0.90
t-value 3.25 3.89 5.86 8.21 5.76 2.41
fx w eur
 1 –528.20 34.75 1281.02 –87.84 1114.55 –2052.03
t-value –0.26 0.02 1.19 –0.09 0.80 –0.39
fx russia
 2 2.05 30.54 83.44 –19.82 30.01 –108.13
t-value 0.10 2.18 5.85 –1.51 1.62 –1.75
fx asia pac
 3 2567.56 3111.68 1401.34 –240.30 3002.21 –449.13
t-value 3.00 5.26 2.43 –0.45 4.00 –0.18
fx s amer
 4 –1526.15 –333.83 810.87 1705.42 –862.05 –2801.47
t-value –1.71 –0.54 1.57 3.58 –1.28 –1.13
nyse
 5 665.46 456.79 –301.12 206.31 –35.02 808.70
t-value 1.28 1.19 –1.22 0.90 –0.11 0.56
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Comment on Chapters 1 and 2 Kenneth C. Abbott
First of all, I want to thank the NBER for inviting me to this conference.
Among the attendees are professors from my student days, academics
whose works I’ve admired for years, and regulators whose role I have come
to respect more and more. I also thank the authors of the two papers for
their work in this important ﬁeld.
For years, value-at-risk (VaR) has had both its supporters and its de-
tractors in the academic and regulatory communities. The detractors have
been quick to point out that VaR fails to capture extreme market move-
ments and does not react quickly enough to changes in market conditions.
Supporters, on the other hand, simply look to its simplicity of purpose (to
gain some crude measure of likely trading loss) and, more importantly, to
the degree of uniformity it has imposed on the risk measurement processes
used at banks and brokerages. I agree that it’s far from perfect, but it does
serve a very useful purpose.
As a practitioner, my concern has always been (and continues to be) that
those studying the numbers emanating from banks’ risk processes view
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Morgan Stanley.those numbers as being similar to the random variables coming from some
natural, or at least stationary, statistical process. While it is certainly not my
intention to throw mud at the risk processes that ﬁnancial institutions have
spent so much time, eﬀort, and money to put in place, I feel the need to
make clear to everyone some of the problems inherent in those processes.
First, there is a considerable lack of consistency in the measurement of
VaR across ﬁnancial institutions. The Market Risk Amendment of 1996
standardized some aspects of VaR calculation, including the conﬁdence
level, the time frame of the loss estimate, the minimum amount of histori-
cal data required, and the minimum number of yield curve points neces-
sary, to name but a few. It did not, however, say which methodology should
be used (variance/covariance, Monte Carlo simulation, or Historical Sim-
ulation), nor did it specify exactly how much data should be used in the
process.
I recently conducted an informal poll of ﬁfteen major ﬁnancial institu-
tions and found that Historical Simulation is used by about 80 percent of
them. One institution still used variance/covariance, while the rest did
Monte Carlo simulations. What surprised me, however, was that the amount
of data used ranged from one year to ﬁve years, with the mode of the dis-
tribution being two years. What this suggests is that banks’ risk measure-
ments will show varying degrees of sensitivity to short-term (and possibly
short-lived) changes in market volatility. Most institutions update their
datasets quarterly. The addition of one quarter to a rolling four-quarter
dataset will be signiﬁcantly greater than that to a twenty-quarter dataset.
Equally important, the Market Risk Amendment did not clearly deﬁne
the standards for proﬁt and loss (P&L) calculation for use in VaR back-
tests. While the recently released Consultative Paper makes some reference
to the standardization of P&L, it has remained unclear. Regulators have
been known to diﬀer on the deﬁnition of the “clean” P&L required for back-
tests.
A major issue I see with studying VaR in conjunction with trading 
P&L in a time series framework (e.g., autoregressive integrated moving av-
erage [ARIMA], generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic
[GARCH], etc.) regards the stationarity of the measures themselves. VaR
is clearly a function of the underlying trading position in a given trading
book. Some books are very stable or change slowly over time. Certain pro-
prietary books, for example, will hold on to sets of positions for extended
periods of time. Other books, however, will show very high degrees of
turnover. I have seen certain trading books used for intraday positioning
that have shown no end-of-day positions. As a result, they would have no
VaR attributed to them. (As a practical matter, for days when the book was
ﬂat, I assigned a certain de minimusVaR to them based on the average level
of risk taking over a period of time.)
This is especially important in the context of very liquid derivatives mar-
92 James O’Brien and Jeremy Berkowitzkets. These portfolios are often very large and frequently represent the plu-
rality of the risk taking going on within a ﬁnancial institution. These posi-
tions can go from hugely long to hugely short in the course of minutes. As
a result, these desks are often the risk “steering wheels” for banks’ trading
portfolios.
Another area where the changing composition of trading books is im-
portant to note involves books used to contain large syndication or block
trading positions. Here, the book might go from levels of risk near zero to
ones of tens of millions of dollars of VaR in an afternoon. Their risk might
be reduced quickly, or it might be worked oﬀ gradually over time. Either
way, the risk of these types of books is anything but stationary.
A third area of concern involves changing risk appetites within ﬁrms.
Certain trading books may be cut back, often drastically, by senior man-
agement. This may take place during market crises, or it may reﬂect man-
agement’s lack of conﬁdence in a strategy or a trader. It would be diﬃcult
to account or correct for this in any time series analysis of VaR.
A fourth consideration involves the tendency of banks to err on the side
of conservatism in their VaR measures. Given a choice between a highly ac-
curate measure that might occasionally understate the VaR and a more
conservative metric, all banks are likely to choose the conservative mea-
sure. This is because there is a severe penalty for an excess number of out-
liers (i.e., more than 1 percent at the 99 percent conﬁdence level) in the reg-
ulatory capital calculation. In fact, it is not uncommon for books to show
no outliers over extended periods of time. This is pointed out in earlier
work (2002) by Berkowitz and O’Brien.
A ﬁnal consideration regarding methodology involves changes in the
methodology itself. Firms are constantly upgrading the techniques used to
estimate their risk. Notably, these are not uniformly to reduce VaR. In fact,
a casual examination of changes in bank’s methodologies are likely to re-
veal as many VaR-increasing changes as decreasing ones. Usually, one does
not go back to restate earlier trading days’ VaR to reﬂect the new method-
ology unless the change took place near the beginning of a quarter. These
changes are likely to manifest themselves as jumps in the VaR that have
nothing to do with true trading risk.
The measurement of P&L presents still more issues relevant in this con-
text. Some recent work has suggested that time series analysis of actual
trading P&L be used as a measure of VaR. While this would certainly re-
ﬂect market volatility better, it presents a number of diﬃculties.
First, one has to deﬁne trading P&L. While Financial Accounting Stan-
dard 133 has helped to deﬁne what should be marked-to-market, the actual
deﬁnition of marked-to-market varies from book to book. In most cases it
is fairly easy. Cash equity books have prices that are posted daily. These
prices are used (among other things) to set margin levels, so they can prob-
ably be counted on to be reasonable.
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U.S. corporate bond market, for example. Pricing is available every day for
most bonds, but much of that is matrix pricing and does not necessarily
represent where a bond would trade in the market. Even if the price were
“real” it might be a bid for an odd lot and not for size.
Third, ﬁrms are likely to use trader marks for positions, checking them
periodically with outside sources for veracity. Many of these books have
positions within them that have poor price discovery. Many high-yield
bonds, for example, are only repriced weekly. Other trading books have po-
sitions which are clearly “trading” positions, inasmuch as they are there to
capture short-term gains, but for which there is no pricing available at all.
It is not uncommon for banks to have distressed debt positions for which
one will observe no price changes for weeks or even months at a time. As a
result, all measures of P&L on these portfolios must be viewed as approx-
imations of changes in value.
Fourth, the timing of certain P&L events may be subjective. For ex-
ample, one may observe that a bond spread has widened 10 basis points be-
tween day 1 and day 10. Is it safe to assume that the widening took place
gradually, suggesting that the loss be recognized on a straight-line basis?
Or is it more appropriate to take the loss all at once, perhaps when there
was another trade on the market to justify the new price?
The subjectivity of P&L events is exaggerated in the mark-to-model
framework, which may aﬀect many derivative transactions. Model changes
for derivative books may result in P&L events in dealer portfolios. While
some of these events may be covered by reserves set aside for such pur-
poses, other losses may not. This may be due to models behind large posi-
tions that are based primarily upon variables that cannot be observed di-
rectly.
I think that one possible way of addressing all of these issues is to make
bank regulators much more aware of all of the issues involved in the calcu-
lation of P&L and the estimation of VaR. I think it would be enormously
instructive for bank examiners to study P&L time series to come to an un-
derstanding of which pieces of it are purely objective (i.e., based upon
prices and/or model input parameters clearly observed in the market) and
which pieces less so.
On the VaR side, regulators need to remember that VaR is simply an or-
der statistic—a (sometimes) crude heuristic used to estimate the shape of a
loss distribution.
While I’m sure that many ﬁrms would be hesitant to release detailed
P&L and risk data freely into the academic community, there are probably
ways to normalize the data and obfuscate the exact source (i.e., which desk
produced the results) that would pass banks’ data security rules. This
might help all involved gain more insight into how it can be used more ef-
fectively.
94 James O’Brien and Jeremy BerkowitzComment on Chapters 1 and 2 Paul Kupiec
Let me begin by thanking the NBER for the opportunity to participate in
the Woodstock ﬁnancial regulatory conference. I would also like to thank
the authors, Philippe Jorion, James O’Brien, and Jeremy Berkowitz for the
opportunity to discuss their papers.
Both of the papers I have been asked to discuss are motivated by the con-
jecture that the widespread adoption of value-at-risk (VaR) measurement
and risk management techniques leads to increased market volatility. The
mechanism causing excess volatility is herding behavior among market
participants who identically measure and manage risk. Groupthink in risk
measurement and management practices, it is alleged, leads investors to
construct similar exposures and display a uniform reaction to unantici-
pated market developments. Presumably this leads to overreactions in
market clearing prices, as liquidity providers are ill-prepared to absorb the
sales demand of the stampeding VaR-driven investors. The corollary to
this conjecture is that unless there is diversity among investor risk mea-
surement and management practices, the buy side of the capital markets
are in danger of evaporating when unanticipated market events create sell
signals for VaR-focused investors.
In considering the merits of this conjecture, it is unclear to me what spe-
cial role VaR has to do with creating herdlike behavior. Value at risk is not
a trading strategy—it is a speciﬁc way of measuring risk. VaR has no di-
rect link with expected return and so it cannot play a deﬁning role in the
construction of proﬁtable trading strategies. There is no theoretical or em-
pirical literature of which I am aware that suggests that there is a market
price for bearing VaR exposure.1 VaR limits can be used to control trading
losses, but the use of VaR limits does not create positive feedback trading
demands that are, for example, required by portfolio insurance dynamic
hedges.
VaR is a useful way of measuring and monitoring the exposure of agents
that trade risk on behalf of a ﬁnancial institution. It may, moreover, also be
convenient for an institution to use VaR to set limits on these agents’ ca-
pacity to assume risk. But VaR is not unique in this regard. Risk measures
and limits based on durations, convexity, and ﬁxed shocks to the yield
curve have long been used to monitor and place limits on the interest rate
risks taken by ﬁxed-income traders. Similarly, before the popularization of
VaR, options traders’ positions were monitored and limited according to
rules that used the aggregate delta and vega values of their portfolios. What
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1. Yet many investors have used VaR measures in the denominator of pseudo-Sharpe mea-
sures of ex post trading performance.is unclear to me is why the use of VaR should be unique in its power to
cause herding and excess volatility. If risk management encourages herd-
ing, then any measure of risk that facilitates monitoring and control of
trading activity could give rise to the excess volatility concerns that have
been voiced regarding the use of VaR.
It is possible that VaR could be a stronger stimulant for herding behav-
ior than would be the case for other risk and control measures. Unlike
duration-based or other methods for limiting risk, VaR estimates are a di-
rect determinant of a bank’s minimum regulatory capital requirement. The
Basel Market Risk Amendment sets a bank’s capital requirement for mar-
ket risks using the bank’s VaR estimates in a formula for minimum regula-
tory capital (MRC; this formula is well described in Jorion’s paper). It is
possible that unanticipated changes in asset prices, correlations, or volatil-
ities could result in pressure on regulatory capital capacities in a manner
that encourages banks to initiate portfolio adjustments. No other widely
used risk monitoring measure has a direct link to minimum regulatory cap-
ital needs. The problem with this line of reasoning is that, to date, no U.S.
bank has been at risk of becoming less than adequately capitalized due to
an unanticipated increase in MRC for market risk.
Quantitative requirements surrounding the construction of banks’
MRCs ensure that a bank’s daily VaR estimate reacts sluggishly to in-
creases in market volatility.2 As a consequence, it is highly improbable that
unanticipated increases in market factor volatilities can increase daily VaR
to a point that it dominates the sixty-day moving average component of the
MRC formula, given the attached multiplierof three.3Thus, spikes in mar-
ket volatilities alone are unlikely to cause large daily trading rebalancing
demands. For daily VaR to dominate in the MRC calculation, a bank must
increase its exposures to market factors by a substantial amount. Absent
large changes in bank positions, MRC requirements move only sluggishly
from day to day. Moreover, even when banks change positions substan-
tially, the sixty trading-day moving average component of the MRC for-
mula ensures that minimum regulatory capital can only decline gradually.
This feature limits the eﬀectiveness of stop-loss trading and wholesale po-
sition liquidations as a capital minimization feature.
Even if banks exhibit herdlike reactions to changes in market conditions,
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2. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996a, p. 46) speciﬁes quantitative stan-
dards for the implicit calculation of market factor volatilities and correlations in regulatory
VaR calculations: “The choice of historical observation period (sample period) for calculat-
ing value-at-risk will be constrained to a minimum length of one year. For banks that use a
weighting scheme or other methods for the historical observation period, the “eﬀective” ob-
servation period must be at least one year (that is, the weighted average time lag of the indi-
vidual observations cannot be less than 6 months).”
3. A 3 multiplier on the sixty-day moving average VaR component applies to a bank with
satisfactory backtest results. The multiplier can be increased should a bank’s VaR perform
poorly in backtests (see the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996a).bank MRC requirements provide only a weak signal of banks’ position ad-
justments. The signal will be further diminished if banks reallocate the pro-
ceeds of their liquidated positions to other positions in the trading book.
Bank trading desks may, moreover, also rebalance away from troubled
markets but attempt to maintain internal VaR utilization targets.4 All of
these issues make MRC a less-than-ideal medium for studying bank herd-
ing behavior. It is perhaps not surprising that Jorion ﬁnds very little evi-
dence of a strong positive correlation in bank’s market risk minimum cap-
ital requirements. While the evidence that Jorion presents is consistent
with diversity among bank trading positions and strategies, given MRC
construction, the lack of strong positive correlation among bank MRCs is
not strong evidence against the possibility of herding behavior in at least
some trading markets.
Since unanticipated increases in market volatility are unlikely to in-
crease a bank’s market risk capital requirement in a manner that would
cause signiﬁcant shedding of risky positions, the regulatory risk to a bank
would seem to be driven by the bank’s performance on VaR backtests. For
backtesting, daily VaR estimates must be compared against daily trading
book proﬁts and losses (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996b).
If losses exceed a bank’s daily VaR estimate, an exception is recorded. An
excessive number of exceptions within a 250-day window is cause for an in-
crease in the bank’s regulatory multiplier.
In their 2002 paper, Berkowitz and O’Brien document that daily VaR ex-
ceptions are rare events. In a sample that includes six large U.S. banks over
the period January 1998 through March 2000, only sixteen exceptions were
recorded. Of these, fourteen occurred during the period August 1989–
October 1998. Only one bank in their sample experienced enough excep-
tions during this interval to qualify it for an elevated regulatory capital
multiplier.5 To date, it appears that banks have experienced few, if any, sit-
uations where an unanticipated movement in markets has caused losses
that put banks at risk of insuﬃcient or higher regulatory capital require-
ments for market risk. Still, if VaR-based capital regulations are a cause of
herding, one would expect capital regulations to have caused risk control
sales during the August 1998–October 1998 period. In an earlier draft of
their paper, Berkowitz and O’Brien focused on bank daily trade revenue
data from this period. While they found some commonalities among bank
trading revenues during this episode, they did not ﬁnd strong evidence of
trading behavior consistent with VaR-driven herding behavior.
Market risk capital regulations alone seem unlikely to make VaR a spe-
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4. In my experience, many banks set VaR limits for trading activities and monitor desks ac-
cording to their utilization of a given VaR limit.
5. Some individual bank exceptions documented in the Berkowitz and O’Brien study ap-
pear to be large enough so that the bank’s daily loss exceeded the bank’s MRC, but these losses
were still small relative to the bank’s overall capital position.cial attractor that encourages herding among institutional investors. Insti-
tutional investors may, however, still exhibit herding tendencies, yet these
tendencies may not be very apparent when examining banks’ quarterly
MRCs and trading revenues (as in Jorion), or even when examining bank
daily trading revenues (as in Berkowitz and O’Brien).
If investors follow similar trading strategies and have stop-loss control
measures in place, unanticipated market movements could periodically
trigger sympathetic rebalancing behavior that is unrelated to regulatory
capital constraints. Again, this has nothing to do with VaR, even though
VaR measures may be used by banks to measure and monitor risk expo-
sure. If institutions exhibit such behavior, positive fee and interest income
components recorded in trading operations revenues and the revenue di-
versiﬁcation beneﬁts gained from multiple trading activities (equity, FX,
ﬁxed income, etc.) may make it diﬃcult to detect, in quarterly data, the
commonality of trading patterns generated by herding. If herding is a fea-
ture of these markets, one might anticipate ﬁnding stronger evidence of its
existence in the daily proﬁt and loss (P&L) trading account data analyzed
by Berkowitz and O’Brien. In the remainder of this discussion, we consider
issues associated with the analysis of daily trading revenues.
Berkowitz and O’Brien (2005) analyze the daily trading P&Ls for a
sample of six large U.S. banks from January 1998 to March 2003. They an-
alyze these data by interpreting the estimates from both a random coeﬃ-
cient linear-factor model and a 150-day rolling window linear-factor
model that generates time-varying factor loadings. The authors discuss a
number of limiting issues associated with the interpretation of the random
coeﬃcient factor-model estimates, and, for me at least, the exercise only
conﬁrms that bank positions (factor loadings) vary daily, and sometimes
by substantial magnitudes. The random coeﬃcients approach turns out to
be less than ideal for drawing inferences about bank herding behavior, and
Berkowitz and O’Brien focus on estimates from a rolling factor model re-
gression approach. They argue that time series comovements between fac-
tor loading estimates and the level of the risk factors is evidence that banks
rebalance as factors move. After analyzing the relationship between rolling
regression-factor loading estimates and the level of market risk factors,
Berkowitz and O’Brien ﬁnd only fragmentary evidence of commonalities
in banks’ factor-loading movements. They conclude that there is no strong
evidence that supports the VaR-herding hypothesis in their sample data.
Even here, however, the interpretation of the rolling-regression model esti-
mates presented by Berkowitz and O’Brien is diﬃcult, and it is unclear
what their results imply regarding the herding hypothesis.
Berkowitz and O’Brien estimate a model where trading revenue is a lin-
ear function of percentage changes in some market risk factors (exchange
rate and equity market factors) and changes in the levels of other market
factors (the ten-year Treasury rate, and four credit spread measures). In a
98 James O’Brien and Jeremy Berkowitztypical linear factor model for equity positions, asset returns are modeled
as linear functions of the returns on common market factors. Ignoring div-
idend income, a linear factor model with a single factor, F ˜
t, for equity re-
turns is typically written
(1)    0     e ˜t.
If expression (1) holds, trading revenue in a mark-to-market book that is
not rebalanced is given by
(2)  P ˜
t    0   ( P t 1)   e ˜ tP t 1.
If the return-factor model beta coeﬃcient is positive, we would expect the
estimated factor loadings in the 150-day rolling Berkowitz and O’Brien
trading revenue model to be positively related to the level of the factor.
When the market risk factor increases over time, the estimated rolling re-
gression coeﬃcient should also increase if the linear-factor return model
correctly describes asset price dynamics.
In the ﬁxed income setting, relationships between daily trading revenues
and interest rate changes are harder to predict, even if bank ﬁxed-income
positions are not rebalanced. If a bank’s positions are not rebalanced and
are exclusively ﬂoating rate (for simplicity, assume rates are continuously
reset), accrued interest will decline in proportion with rates, and the mark-
to-market change in the ﬂoating rate position’s value will be zero. A bank
with such exposures should exhibit a constant negative coeﬃcient in a lin-
ear regression of ﬁxed-income trading revenue on the change in the level 
of interest rates. Alternatively, at the other end of the spectrum, should a
bank’s ﬁxed income instruments be exclusively long-term discount instru-
ments, the Berkowitz and O’Brien factor model speciﬁcation should pro-
duce factor loading estimates that are larger (in absolute value) the lower
are ten-year Treasury rates, owing to the convexity of long-dated discount
instruments.
These issues complicate the interpretation of the time-series relationship
between the market risk factors (measured in levels) and the factor load-
ing estimates from the 150-day rolling regressions in the Berkowitz and
O’Brien paper. A strong correlation between movements in the rolling-
window trading revenue-factor model loading estimates and the level of
market risk factors does not necessarily imply that a bank has altered its
trading book positions in response to a change in the market factor. Infor-
mation on changes in daily trading revenues and market risk factors by
themselves may not be suﬃcient to identify bank rebalancing activities.
To summarize my discussion let me reiterate that I do not stay up nights
worrying about whether the widespread adoption of VaR techniques has
increased the potential for herding behavior. Based on my professional ex-
 F t  
F t 1
 F t  
F t 1
 P t  
P t 1
Estimating Bank Trading Risk 99perience—which is clearly limited, but includes studying, working in, and
examining ﬁnancial institutions—I think that capital market participants
may at times demonstrate what appears to be fadlike behavior in their in-
vestment strategies. In my view, apparent commonalities in bank trading
activities have nothing to do with the institutions’ use of VaR measure-
ment. Value at risk is just one of many risk management and control tools
available, and its widespread adoption will not increase the tendency for
risk-takers to herd. I think it is fair to say that the authors of both papers
share my views regarding the use of VaR. While both authors claim to ﬁnd
little systematic evidence in their respective datasets that links the use of
VaR to herdlike behavior among dealer banks, it is also clear that the avail-
able data may not be adequate to produce powerful tests of the herding hy-
pothesis.
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Discussion Summary
A single general discussion of these two related papers was conducted. Part
of the discussion centered on whether herding by banks, especially in cri-
sis situations, is a material concern, and on how the authors might bet-
ter present evidence about it. In their responses, both Jorion and O’Brien
agreed that the extent of herding is an interesting and important question
but noted that it is largely beyond the scope of their papers, which are fo-
cused on whether the use of VaR measures is likely to cause herding. They
interpreted the remarks as being consistent with their own conclusions—
that it does not. They agreed that their data and methods are not ideal for
addressing the broader questions.
Andrew Lo suggested some additional measures would be informative.
Noting that outliers matter more to systemic risk than average correlations,
he suggested looking at averages of absolute value of correlations. He also
suggested a greater focus on the experience of individual banks, since a sys-
temic event need involve a failure of only one or two major banks.
100 James O’Brien and Jeremy BerkowitzRichard Evans suggested that the VaR data used by all of the authors,
while diﬀerent in the details of sources and construction, may suﬀer from
a lack of comparability across institutions. The assets that are included 
in the portfolios for which VaR measures are disclosed diﬀer cross-
sectionally and over time at a given ﬁnancial institution. Proﬁt-and-loss re-
sults are badly distorted, especially at a daily frequency, for a number of
reasons, such as the impact of accounting reserves. Some institutions that
appear in the samples are relatively small; the behavior of their VaR mea-
sures may be diﬀerent and of less interest than at the major dealer banks.
Overall, although he believes that better data would reveal higher correla-
tions of VaR and returns than the authors ﬁnd, use of VaR measures does
not itself cause herding by the dealer banks.
Estimating Bank Trading Risk 101